northwestpasob.blogg.se - Antivirus for google chrome os

#Antivirus for google chrome os update#
#Antivirus for google chrome os full#
#Antivirus for google chrome os software#
#Antivirus for google chrome os code#
#Antivirus for google chrome os series#

The approachĭesigned relies on a number of independent techniques: These protections aid in defendingĪgainst both opportunistic and dedicated adversaries. The likelihood of successful attack, and reduces the usefulness of This combination limits our attack surface, reduces the Of OS-level protection mechanisms and exploit mitigation The lowest level of our security strategy involves a combination The architecture of Chromium browsers provides us with some very nice process isolation already, but

To limit how much damage the adversary can do provided that he's Prevent these attacks and then several more layers of protection that try Strategy, we wish to provide defense in depth: mechanisms that try to

#Antivirus for google chrome os code#

Order to get some malicious code onto the device. HTML5/Extension APIs, or trying to subvert our autoupdate process in Tricking the user into giving a malicious web app unwarranted access to Gives them control of one of the Chromium-based browser processes, an exploit in a plugin, There are several vectors through which an adversary might try toĬompromise a Chromium OS device remotely: an exploit that Into two different classes of attacks: remote system compromise and device theft. We further subdivide the possible threats If the opportunistic adversary does steal a device and the user's data is in the clear, the opportunistic adversary may take it.įor version 1.0, we are focusing on dangers posed by To gain unwarranted privileges (webcam access, mic access, etc). Sites that will compromise their machines or to web apps that will try The opportunistic adversary will, however, deploy attacks designed to lure users on the web to They are not targeting a specific user or enterprise, and they are not going to steal the user's machine to obtain the user's data.

The opportunistic adversary is just trying to compromise an individual When designing security technology for Chromium OS systems, we consider two different kinds of adversaries:

#Antivirus for google chrome os update#

In the event of a security bug, once an update is pushed, the user can reboot and be safe.

Recovering from an attack that replaces or modifies system binaries should be as simple as rebooting.

The system provides a multi-tiered defense against malicious websites and other network-based attackers.

A user's data can't be exposed due to the mistakes of other users on the system.

The user can manage their risk with respect to data loss, even in the face of device loss or theft.

The owner should be able to delegate login rights to users of their choice.

We are initially targeting the following use cases with Chromium OS devices: Them informed, ask fewer questions, require them to makeĭecisions only about things they comprehend, and be sure that we fail-safe if they don't understand a choice and just want to click and make We're working toįigure out the right signals to send our users, so that we can keep Such complexity, and that is not our users' fault. To make accurate judgments about one's level of risk in the face of Really a huge set of intertwined, semi-compatible implementations of overlapping standards. In real life, people assess their risk all the time.

#Antivirus for google chrome os software#

Since we have the advantage of knowing which software should be running on the device at all times, we should be better able to deploy solutions that leave the user's machine humming along Until now, the security community has had to deploy solutions that cope with arbitrary software running on users' machines as a result, these solutions have often cost the user in terms of system performance or ease-of-use. Installing services, or re-compromising the system after reboot.īeing safe is not an advanced or optional feature. Then, we'll also make it difficult for an attacker to persist their presence on the system by preventing them from adding an account, We'll put another layer of defenses in place to make it difficult to turn a user account compromise into root or a System, but assume that the attacker will.

#Antivirus for google chrome os series#

In light of our first principle, we will deploy a variety of defenses to act as a series of System to stop us from shipping something that is still very good.ĭeploy defenses in depth. Thus, we must not allow our search for some mythical perfect Will be unforeseen interactions between multiple complex systems thatĬreate security holes, and there will be vulnerabilities that aren't caught by pre-release testing. Guiding principles The perfect is the enemy of the good.

#Antivirus for google chrome os full#

Our users, while still enabling them to make full use of their cloud Overview of the threat model against which we will endeavor to protect The rest of this document, we first explain these principles andĭiscuss some expected use cases for Chromium OS devices. To do so, we've followed a set of four guiding principles: Users of Chromium OS-based devices with a system that is both practically secure and easy to use.

We have made a concerted effort to provide